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FISCAL EQUALIZATION:





iven increased mobility of capital, many coun-
tries face difficulties in taxing corporate in-
come. Some observers fear a race to the bottom and
wonder whether international economic integration
has gone too far.In fact,experience with the finances
of local jurisdictions – cities, towns, and municipali-
ties – suggests that governments operating under
conditions of high mobility are forced to rely more
heavily on the taxation of property and land than on
personel and corporate income taxes. Although this
is true for local governments in most countries, it is
not true for Germany.
Germany currently has about 12,500 municipal gov-
ernments,each of which runs its own budget,employs
public servants and raises revenue from various
sources.These municipal governments have some tax
autonomy in the sense that they decide on the actual
tax rate of land tax and of business income tax. But,
quite contrary to what might be expected, the rev-
enue share of business tax is substantial in this case,
and the average statutory tax rate is suprisingly high.
Even after the 2008 tax reform it is above 13 percent.
While the strong reliance on business taxation seems
to contradict conventional wisdom,it is important to
emphasize that there are some specific institutions
that govern the fiscal policies of local jurisdictions in
Germany. Most notably, German municipalities are
subject to a system of vertical and horizontal fiscal
transfers. Closer inspection reveals that this compre-
hensive system of fiscal equalization can partly
explain why local governments rely so heavily on
business income tax.
There are basically two features of municipal
finances in Germany that could explain the unusual
tax mix and the heavy reliance on business taxes:
(1) The fiscal equalization system tends to reduce the
marginal cost of using business income tax in a set-
ting with high mobility.
(2) The fiscal equalization system provides protec-
tion against revenue fluctuations that are inherent to
business income taxation.
It should be pointed out,however,that there are fur-
ther institutional characteristics in Germany that
play an important role. Most important, the tax law
is given and tax collection is generally centralized at
the state level. Otherwise, one could expect that the
administrative complexity of business taxation
would overwhelm local authorities. Moreover, local
business taxation in Germany is further simplified
due to a system of formula apportionment that
avoids many of the problems of profit-shifting
between affiliated firms, an issue which in the con-
text of multinational corporations has recently re-
ceived considerable attention.Furthermore,until the
2008 reform, the business tax was deductible in per-
sonal and corporate income taxation, implying that
the effective burden on firms was lower.
Sources of funds
Besides user fees and income from private sector
activity, municipal governments in Germany obtain
funds mainly from three sources. First, municipalities
receive a 15 percent share of personal income taxes
paid by its residents and a share of VAT.The munici-
palities have no discretion with regard to the tax rate,
and tax collection is centralized at the state level.
Second, local municipalities raise their own tax rev-
enue. This relates mainly to the local business tax
and to the land tax.Except for special cases,the busi-
ness tax is essentially a tax on the profits of local
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firms.While the tax law is a federal law that applies
equally to all municipalities, the municipal council
decides on the actual tax rate. With regard to land
taxation, again, all responsibilities of tax admi-
nistration, including assessment, are centralized at
the federal or state level. There are, however, two
tax rates that the municipality determines: one is
levied on land devoted to agricultural use and the
second to land used for residential and commercial
purposes.
A third source of municipal funds comprises grants
from the state governments. Most notably, all German
states (except for Berlin,Bremen,and Hamburg which
have city-state governments) engage in a system of fis-
cal transfers from the state to the municipal level.
While a part of these vertical transfers are paid as
matching grants, the lion’s share of grants is uncondi-
tional, in that recipient governments can freely decide
upon their use. However, the distribution of these
funds takes place through systems of fiscal equaliza-
tion at the level of the states.These systems determine
grants based on indicators of fiscal capacity and fiscal
need. The latter is basically the conceded budget per
resident; the former is a measure
of tax revenue at standardized tax
rates. If a jurisdiction displays a
fiscal capacity above fiscal need,
it will not receive equalization
grants, and in some settings, it
may even be a net contributor to
the fiscal equalization system. If
its capacity falls short of fiscal
need, however, the jurisdiction is
a recipient of grants such that
grants partly compensate for the
gap between fiscal need and fiscal
capacity.
In order to illustrate the relative
importance of the respective
sources of revenue, the Table
provides information on the com-
position of municipal revenue in
North Rhine-Westphalia, Ger-
many’s largest state.
The data reveal several charac-
teristics of municipal finance in
Germany. First, municipalities
strongly rely on rather distortive
taxes. In particular, average per
capita revenue from the local
business tax is more than three times larger than rev-
enue from the land tax.At the same time, local busi-
ness tax revenues display substantial inter-jurisdic-
tional disparities. As indicated by the coefficient of
variation, the dispersion of local business tax rev-
enue is almost four times larger than the dispersion
of land tax revenue.
The last line of the Table highlights the prominent
role of fiscal equalization in municipal finance in
Germany. On average fiscal equalization transfers
amount to more than a quarter of total revenues.
However,dispersion is also very high with respect to
this source of revenue. While some jurisdictions
(with low fiscal need and high fiscal capacity) are not
eligible for fiscal equalization, others receive rather
substantial transfers from the state.
The role of fiscal equalization grants
We can distinguish at least three effects of fiscal
equalization on municipal budgets. First, since equa-
lization grants are financed through vertical trans-
Table
Main sources of municipal public funds in North Rhine-Westphalia in 2005
Mean Std.Dev Min Max  CV
b)
in  per capita
Localbusiness tax revenue 361.7  236.2  25.10  1,486  0.653 
Land tax revenue 119.2  20.12  69.82  238.9  0.169 
Shared tax revenue
a) 295.9 50.67  181.7  469.2  0.171 
Fiscal equalizationgrants 207.5  133.2  0  599.5  0.642 
a)Shares from personalincome taxes andVAT. – 
b) Coefficient of variation.
Source: Own calculations and Statistical Office of North Rhine-Westphalia.
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Figure 1fers,they raise funds disposable to local governments.
Second, due to its redistributive nature, fiscal equal-
ization compensates for disparities in the fis-
cal capacity of jurisdictions.Third, fiscal equaliza-tion
provides insurance against revenue shocks since an
unexpected change in revenues will be partly com-
pensated by offsetting changes in equalization grants.
The substantial impact of equalization grants on the
amount of funds available at the lower level as well
as its redistributive nature are illustrated in Figure 1.
The horizontal axis ranks all 396 municipalities in
North Rhine-Westphalia according to fiscal capacity,
and the vertical axis measures revenues in per capi-
ta-terms. Municipalities with large funds are closer
to the left of the diagram.The lower curve shows fis-
cal capacity before fiscal equalization whereas the
upper curve shows the revenue capacity,i.e.,the sum
of fiscal capacity and equalization grants.As the fig-
ure shows, most municipalities receive additional
funds from equalization. Only municipalities that
display an unusually large fiscal capacity do not.This
is illustrated by the fact that the curves overlap in the
left corner of the diagram.Moreover,the slope of the
upper curve is flatter, which indicates that the dis-
parities between more and less wealthy jurisdictions
are reduced by fiscal equalization.
While the transfers can be expected to create impor-
tant income effects on municipalities, it should be
noted that those effects would actually tend to result
in low rather than high tax rates. Thus, they cannot
explain why business tax rates are so high.However,
the systems of fiscal equalization that are in place in
Germany also produce strong incentive effects on
tax rates. Basically, the fiscal equalization systems
reduce some of the costs associated with using busi-
ness income taxes as a source of local funds.This is a
result of the negative relationship between fiscal
equalization grants and fiscal capacity. In particular,
since fiscal capacity is usually determined by multi-
plying the tax base by a certain standardized tax rate,
fiscal equalization grants are essentially determined
by the local tax base. In the presence of fiscal equal-
ization grants the revenue consequences of a change
in the local tax base are partly offset by changes in
the grants received. Figure 2 provides some indica-
tion of the importance of this effect in Germany by
depicting the marginal degree of redistribution faced
by municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia that
receive equalization grants. The marginal degree of
redistribution is defined here as the fraction of a unit
increase in business tax revenues that is implicitly
appropriated by the transfer system. This fraction is
displayed on the vertical axis. The figures point to a
substantial degree of fiscal redistribution. On aver-
age more than 86 cents of an additional euro of busi-
ness tax revenues is transferred;only 14 cents remain
with the budget of the municipality.
The rather strong degree of redistribution has po-
tentially important consequences for tax policy. In
order to illustrate this, let us consider the impact of
an increase of the local business tax rate. In addi-
tion to withdrawing resources from the private sec-
tor, a higher tax effort depresses the local tax base.
This is due to an outflow of capital and the discour-
agement of private investment, which usually go
along with higher tax rates.The reduction in the tax
base due to taxation results in an excess burden that
raises the marginal cost of funds and provides a
strong incentive to lower tax rates. Since a decrease
in the tax base is compensated with an increase in
transfers, however, fiscal equalization works in the
opposite direction. The disin-
centive to tax mobile capital
that is usually faced due to an
adverse effect on the tax base is
compensated by an increase in
grants. Thus, in the presence of
fiscal equalization, tax rates will
generally be higher than in a sit-
uation without redistributive
transfers. Recent literature on
fiscal federalism has stressed
the role of fiscal equalization in
altering the incentives faced by
local tax policy. In particular, it
has been shown that redistribu-
tive intergovernmental transfer
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schemes in general may induce governments to
raise even possibly distorting taxes (Smart 1998;
Koethenbuerger 2002). Hence, the rather strong
degree of redistribution experienced by the munic-
ipalities in all German states and illustrated for
North Rhine- Westphalia in Figure 2 might serve as
an explanation for why,despite its distortive effects,
local business taxation plays such a prominent role
in municipal finance in Germany. In fact, Buettner
(2006) identifies this incentive effect of the margin-
al contribution rate as an important tax driver in
the context of German municipalities.
The close relationship between equalization trans-
fers and local taxing capacity gives rise, however, to
further incentive effects on the tax policy of local
municipalities. In this context, it is important to note
that business income tax revenues are not only a
problematic source of local funds due to the mobili-
ty of tax payers.Fluctuation in business income taxes
resulting from the varying fortunes of firms also
leads to a strong fluctuation in tax revenue. Facing
debt limitations, municipalities are less able to
engage in tax and expenditure smoothing and,hence,
the attempt to rely on shaky tax revenues implies
further budgetary problems that undermine steady
policies.In this situation,fiscal equalization serves as
an insurance mechanism that provides assistance, in
particular in times of unfavorable revenue develop-
ments,and contributes to more stable sources of rev-
enues. Given the large degree of redistribution
inherent to the Geman equalization system, it can
well be expected that a substantial degree of insur-
ance is provided, even if practical implementation
issues result in a considerable time lag.
Comparing US municipalities with those in Germany,
Buettner (2007) has found that in fact own-source
revenues of US municipalities display much less fluc-
tuation than the tax revenues of German municipali-
ties. At the same time the role of fiscal equalization
transfers in restoring fiscal balance is much more
important in Germany when compared with state and
federal grants in the US. Nevertheless, empirical evi-
dence points to higher expenditure fluctuations in
Germany.This indicates that another incentive effect
is present that is related to moral hazard. Perhaps the
large degree of protection provided by the equaliza-
tion system allows German municipalities to rely
much more on unstable revenues like business taxes
rather than on land taxes. In comparison, US munici-
palities cannot rely on grants for fiscal stability and
thus must resort to property taxes.
Conclusion
Given the large differences in taxing capacity, the
systems of fiscal equalization are quite effective in
ensuring that municipalities with small revenues
have financial means that are not vastly different
from the average.The system further provides some
insurance against revenue fluctuations that helps
municipalities to provide a steadier flow of services.
However, the fiscal equalization system also gener-
ates important incentive effects.
The incentive effect that originates in a reduced tax
rate sensitivity of the budget can be seen, to a limit-
ed extent, as a means to improve the efficiency of
local finances. This relates to the existence of fiscal
externalities that arise in tax competition.When gov-
ernments raise taxes on mobile tax bases, such as
business income, they may just induce a reallocation
of mobile firms and hence cause an inflow of capital
to other jurisdictions.This contributes to a rise in the
tax revenue of these jurisdictions. If local govern-
ments only consider their own revenue losses and
neglect this beneficial effect on other regions they
will set taxes at an inefficiently low level.In this case
fiscal equalization transfers may be interpreted as
Pigouvian subsidies (Wildasin 1989) that induce a
more efficient local tax policy. However, the large
degree of redistribution seems problematic.The rea-
son is that the taxation of mobile capital not only dis-
torts the interregional allocation but also lowers
overall capital demand in the economy.Therefore,an
almost complete redistribution might over-subsidize
taxation in the sense that it also refunds tax-induced
reductions in the tax base that reflect a reduction in
total capital supply (Bucovetsky and Smart 2006).
Another disincentive effect of the large degree of
redistribution is related to the choice of the revenue
structure. Here, we might observe a moral hazard
problem in the sense that jurisdictions are tempted
not to rely on rather stable land taxes but on unsta-
ble business taxes.
A further problem relates to interjurisdictional het-
erogeneity. German municipalities differ consider-
ably in size and show a rather skewed distribution in
terms of population size and density. This corre-
sponds to a skewed distribution in terms of tax rev-
enue both in absolute value and on a per-capita basis
such that tax revenue is disproportionally higher in
large cities as compared to small municipalities.As a
consequence, fiscal equalization tends to systemati-cally redistribute from large cities to small and, per-
haps, peripheral jurisdictions. This could potentially
have important distortionary effects on the spatial
structure of the economy.To avoid those effects, sys-
tems of equalization tend to have special provisions
for cities.
All this suggests that the equalization system needs
to support municipalities in their difficult task to
finance local budgets without reducing their respon-
sibility too much. In this regard, it seems generally
advantageous for municipal fiscal equalization to
take place at the state level so that different institu-
tional settings can be compared and discussed.
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